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In October, 1971 and again in December, 1972,1 Complete Auto
Transit, Inc., a Michigan corporation engaged in the interstate transportation of motor vehicles, was notified of tax assessments 2 based
upon a Mississippi statute levying a sales tax on the "privilege of...

doing business within th[e] state." 3 The corporation paid the tax
under protest and then filed for a refund, contending that, since its
business "was but one part of an interstate" operation, the application
of the tax to its activities was unconstitutional under the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution. 4

The trial court affirmed

the assessments and Complete Auto Transit appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court. 5 Relying upon the fact that the tax did not
discriminate against interstate commerce, would not result in dupli-

I Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 276-77 (1977).
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 330 So. 2d 268, 269 (Miss. 1976), aff'd, 430 U'S.
274 (1977). Complete Auto Transit, operating under certification of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, transported vehicles assembled by General Motors Corporation. Id. The vehicles
were assembled in Georgia and shipped by rail into Mississippi where Complete Auto Transit
took possession of and subsequently transported them to various dealerships located both within
and without the state of Mississippi. Id. at 269-70.
3 MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-65-13 (Cum. Supp. 1972) (originally codified at Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 10105 (1942)). This statute provided that:
There is hereby levied and assessed, and shall be collected, privilege taxes for
the privilege of engaging or continuing in business or doing business within this
state to be determined by the application of rates against gross proceeds of sales or
gross income or values . . . as provided in the following sections.
The section applicable to Complete Auto Transit provided for application of the tax to the
operation of any "transportation of persons or property for compensation ... between points
within" Mississippi. Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-65-19(2) (Cum. Supp. 1972) (originally codified at
MISS. CODE ANN. § 10109 (1942)). Although the United States Supreme Court in Complete
Auto Transit allowed that this language could be construed to apply only to intrastate commerce, the Court observed that the state supreme court had considered the tax applicable "to
both interstate and intrastate commerce." Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274,
275 n.2 (1977).
It should be noted that the period for which Complete Auto Transit was assessed under the
statute ran only from August, 1968 through July, 1972. Id. at 277. Effective August 1, 1972,
section 27-65-19(2) was amended to exclude from its operation the transportation of property.
1972 Miss. LAws, c. 506, § 2.
4 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 277 (1977). The Constitution
granted to Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5 See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 330 So. 2d 268, 269 (Miss. 1976), aff'd, 430
U.S. 274 (1977).
2
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cate taxation and additionally noting that the corporation had derived
sufficient benefit from the state to justify imposition of the tax, the
6
Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.
7
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction
and, in Complete Auto-Transit, Inc. v. Brady,8 unanimously affirmed
the ruling of the state court, upholding the constitutionality of the tax
as applied to the corporation. 9 In so doing, the Court overruled the
decision 10 in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor 11 in which the
Court had held that state taxation of the "privilege of carrying on
exclusively interstate commerce" was per se unconstitutional.' 2 Noting that the Spector rule lacked a viable "relationship to economic
realities," the Complete Auto Transit Court reasoned that the emphasis placed on "the use of ...

particular words" tended to conceal

the analysis of the actual effect of the tax on interstate commerce and
3
therefore concluded that the rule should be discarded.'
The question of the limits of state taxation of interstate commerce has been probed by the Court since the early days of constitutional interpretation. 14 Although Chief Justice Marshall had recog6 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 330 So. 2d 268, 270, 272 (Miss. 1976), aff'd, 430
U.S. 274 (1977). The court, relying upon Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80
(1948), reasoned that a state may generally tax those local aspects of interstate commerce "sufficiently separate from" activities outside the taxing state. Id. at 270; see notes 33-39 infra and
accompanying text. The validity of the tax was to be measured by the possibility of "cumulative
burdens on interstate commerce not borne by local commerce." 330 So. 2d at 270.
Analyzing previous decisions "arising in [Mississippi]" considered to have upheld similar
levies, id. at 270-71, the court noted Complete Auto Transit's extensive activities in Mississippi
as well as the "police protection and other ... services" provided by the state. Id. at 272.
Based on these considerations, the court concluded that the tax was valid, since it did not
"discriminate against interstate commerce" and further found no potential for the "smother[ing]
[of interstate commerce] by cumulative taxes of several states." Id. Significantly, the court made
no mention of the possible application of Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S.
602 (1951). See id. at 268-72. The Spector decision was overruled by the United States Supreme Court in its affirmance of the Mississippi court's decision. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 289 (1977).
7 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 429 U.S. 813 (1976). Decisions of "the highest
court of a State" which involve "the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution" are reviewable "[b]y appeal" in the United States Supreme
Court when the state court "decision [was] in favor of [the statute's] validity." 28 U.S.C.
§1257(2) (1970).
8 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
9 Id. at 289.
10 Id.
11 340 U.S. 602 (1951). For a discussion of the Spector case, see notes 40-53 infra and
accompanying text.
12 340 U.S. at 609-10.

13 430 U.S. at 279, 288-89 (1977).
14 Barrett, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce-"Direct Burdens," "Multiple Burdens,"
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nized the pervasive nature of congressional control over interstate
commerce in his landmark opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 15 the Court
soon acknowledged that states could exercise some authority over
those aspects of interstate commerce which while within the scope of
congressional power were not "in their nature national." 16 In Cooley
v. Board of Wardens, 17 the Court prescribed an inquiry into the subject matter of the regulation and whether, as a practical matter, the
federal interest in the freedom of interstate commerce required
uniformity.' 8 If so, any state regulation was prohibited even in the
absence of explicit congressional action. 19 However, if, as in Cooley,
the subject matter was such that a state's regulations would not

or What Have You?, 4 VAND.

L. REV. 496, 496 (1951). See also Northwestern States Portland

Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1959); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249,
251-52 (1946).
15 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The dispute in Gibbons concerned the right of the plaintiff
to navigate in the waters between New York and New Jersey in contravention of a New York
statute which purported to confer exclusive navigation rights upon certain individuals. Id. at 2.
Gibbons argued that, insofar as the New York law regulated the use of interstate waters, it was
violative of the commerce clause of the Constitution. Id. at 2, 186; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall included navigation within the meaning of
commerce as used in the Constitution, id. at 189-93, and asserted that when a state attempts
"to regulate commerce .. . among the several States, it is exercising the very power . ..
granted to Congress." Id. at 199. The Court found "great force in [the] argument" that the
power "'to regulate' implies ... full power over the thing to be regulated, . . . exclud[ing],
necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same operation on the same thing."
Id. at 209. While it was acknowledged that, in regulating its internal affairs, a state might enact
laws which appeared to regulate commerce it was concluded that any such law which conflicted
with legislation enacted by Congress would be invalid. Id. at 209-10. Based on this analysis the
Court found the New York statute unconstitutional. Id. at 239-40.
Chief Justice Marshall's view-which asserted federal supremacy in the regulation of interstate commerce-was reiterated with regard to the states' taxing power in Brown v. Maryland,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445-47 (1827). See P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE, 22-23 (1953).
16 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851). In Cooley, the Court
was confronted with the validity of a state statute regulating navigation pilotage. Id. at 311-12,
315. In upholding the statute, the Court recognized a distinction between aspects of commerce
more properly regulated by local authorities and those which require a "uniform system" of
regulation. Id. at 319. The Court concluded that the "regulation of pilots" was "local" in nature
and as such was "best provided for, not by one system, . . . but by as many as the legislative
discretion of the several States should deem applicable." Id.
17 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
18 Id. at 318-19. The Court stated that "[t]he grant of commercial power to Congress does
not contain any terms which expressly exclude the States from exercising an authority over its
subject-matter." Id. at 318. The majority indicated that if the states were to be excluded, in the
absence of federal legislation, it must be due to the national nature of the subject matter. Id.
Absent such a subject, however, the Court concluded "that it is not the mere existence of such
a power, but its exercise by Congress, which may be incompatible with the exercise of the same
power by the States." Id. at 319.
19Id. at 318-19.
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threaten the federal interests protected by the commerce clause, the
states would be free to regulate in the absence of express congressional legislation. 2 0 Subsequently, the Court recognized that interstate commerce could legitimately be required to "'pay its way"' for
the benefit derived from services rendered by the individual
states.2' This recognition, however, did not resolve the issue since
the Supreme Court failed to reach a consensus as to a standard by
22
which such levies were to be judged.
Acknowledging the inconsistency of previous pronouncements, 2 3
the divided Court in Freeman v. Hewit 24 chose to frame its decision
concerning the validity of an Indiana tax solely in terms of whether
the tax operated directly upon interstate commerce.2 5 Questions of
possible duplication of the tax by other states, errors in apportionment or a demonstration of discriminatory operation were deemed
unnecessary considerations in the context of "a direct tax."26 Although the Court acknowledged the validity of a variety of taxing devices with similar economic bases, it found that the direct incidence
of the tax upon interstate commerce sufficed to invalidate the levy in

20

Id.

at 319-21.

21 Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938) (quoting from Postal
Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259 (1919)); see Galveston, H. & S.A. By. v.
Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 225, 227 (1908); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688, 696 (1895);
Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 145 U.S. 1, 24 (1892).
The Court in Western Live Stock indicated that the problem involved the reconciliation of
"the practical needs of a taxing system ... to the double demand that interstate business shall
pay its way, and . . . at the same time . . . not be burdened with cumulative exactions." 303

U.S. at 258.
22 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1959);
Barrett, supra note 14, at 496-97; Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the
Supreme Court, 1974 Term: Standard Pressed Steel and ColonialPipeline, 62 VA. L. REV. 149,
149-50 (1976). Justice Frankfsrter echoed these sentiments in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249
(1946), observing that "[t]he history of this problem is spread over hundreds of volumes of our
Reports. To attempt to harmonize all that has been said in the past would neither clarify what
has gone before nor guide the future." 329 U.S. at 252.
23 Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
24 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
25 Id. at 253-58. In Freeman, the trustee of an estate, a resident of Indiana, arranged for
the sale of certain securities through an Indiana broker. Id. at 250. Although the sale was
executed in New York, Indiana applied a one percent tax to the proceeds of the sale under a
statute which taxed the income "of residents and domiciliaries." Id. at 250-51.
26 Id. at 256-57; see id. at 259-60 (Rutledge, J., concurring). Rejecting the contention that
the permissibility of the tax should depend upon whether another state had duplicated the tax,
the Court noted that "[t]he immunities implicit in the Commerce Clause ... can hardly be
made to depend .. .on the shifting incidence of the varying tax laws of the various States." Id.
at 256.
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these circumstances. 2 7 Under this analysis, interstate commerce was
entitled to a "free flow" through the state without the "imped[iment]"
28
of state taxation directly incident to such trade.
Concurring in Freeman, Justice Rutledge contended that the
Court had reverted to a "long since repudiated" analysis. 2 9 Rather,
30
it was more appropriate to inquire into the economic consequences,
jurisdictional ties 31 and possibilities of burdensome and cumulative
32
taxation in assessing the validity of a state tax.

Subsequent to Freeman, in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v.
Stone, 33 the Court exhibited a further fragmentation, as to the mode
of analysis to be utilized in judging the validity of a state levy. 34 In
upholding the constitutionality of a Mississippi franchise tax, the
Court advanced several possible justifications for its decision, including those advanced by Justice Rutledge in Freeman.3 5 However, a
27 Id. at 255-57. Despite the recognized need for balancing a state's revenue requirements
with "freedom for the national commerce," the Court nevertheless found a distinction between
state taxation and regulations based upon "vital local interests" under the police power. Id. at
253. In contrast to such interests, the Court found that the denial of "a particular source of
income because it taxes the very process of interstate commerce" was not fatal to "a State's
ability to carry on its local function." Id. The Court recognized the "more threatening burden
of" such a levy and suggested the need for stricter scrutiny "of a direct tax on [interstate]
commerce." Id.
28 Id. at 252. The Court indicated "that the Commerce Clause ...
by its own force created
an area of trade free from interference by the States." Id. The Court indicated that a burden
upon interstate commerce, whether due to state taxing powers or any other state powers, would
not be tolerated to the extent that such a burden "impede[s] the free flow of trade between
states." Id. at 252-53.
29 Id. at 261-62, 265-66. Justice Rutledge not only claimed that the mode of analysis
applied by the majority, under which Congress had the sole authority to tax interstate commerce had been abandoned, but also that a general "resurrection" of the theory would serve to
invalidate an infinite number of state taxes previously held to be constitutional. Id. He also
attacked the majority's discussion concerning the invalidity of tax applied "directly" upon interstate commerce, asserting that such a distinction is irrelevant as even an "indirect" tax is
capable of producing "forbidden consequences." Id. at 267-70.
30 Id. at 270.
31 Id. at 271, 273.
32 Id. at 272-74. In questioning the reasoning employed by the majority, Justice Rutledge
contended that not only was the assessment of the constitutional validity of a statute too important a matter to be left to "labels or formulae," but "that increasingly with the years emphasis
ha[d] been placed upon [the] practical consequences and effects" of a particular statute. Id. at
270. Additionally, he asserted that while the Court had at times looked to the language
employed, greater emphasis had been placed upon the actual consequences of a tax in determining its constitutional validity. Id.
33 335 U.S. 80 (1948).
34 See id. at 80-105.
35 Id. at 93, 96. The opinion stated that the tax was on a "local activity" and, furthermore,
was duly apportioned and did not place "an unreasonable burden" upon the taxpayer. Id. The
Court also reasoned that the state was entitled to compensation for services provided to the
taxpayer. Id. at 96.
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plurality of the Court emphasized that the tax in question constituted
a levy "'on the privilege of exercising corportate functions"' as opposed to a concededly impermissible tax on the privilege of doing
business. 36 Justice Rutledge, again concurring, adhered primarily to
the principles of his concurrence in Freeman.37 The dissent, however,
categorized the tax as one on the privilege of doing an interstate business and, consequently, found it invalid regardless of whether the
economic impact was indiscernable from that of a constitutionally ac38
ceptable levy.
The approach of the Memphis Natural Gas dissent-the appraisal
of constitutional validity premised solely upon whether the tax was
imposed upon the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce39 was adopted by the Court in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor. 40 Reminiscent of the approach taken in Freeman,4 1 the Spector
Court invalidated a Connecticut tax assessed on a corporation found
to be engaged in an "exclusively interstate" business. 42 Conceding
36 Id. at 92-93 (quoting Southern Natural Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148, 153 (1937)).
The Court relied upon a similar rationale in Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100,
109-14 (1975), in which a state tax was declared valid based upon the state's right to compensation for services rendered and the permissibility of taxing a company for "doing business . . . in
the corporate form." 421 U.S. at 114. See Hellerstein, supra note 22, at 182--84. For a discussion of Colonial Pipeline, see notes 71-83 infra and accompanying text.
37 335 U.S. 96-99 (Rutledge, J., concurring); see Freeman, 329 U.S. at 259-83; notes 29-32
supra and accompanying text.
38 335 U.S. at 102-05 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter, who had written the
majority opinion in Freeman, 329 U.S. at 250, asserted that the mere fact that a constitutionally
acceptable tax could have been legitimately increased did not automatically legitimate every tax
the state might have levied to collect the same amount. 335 U.S. at 104. It was also contended
that the state had not provided any services for which it could receive compensation except
those for which "subordinate taxing authorities, ha[d] already made exaction." Id. at 100. Based
on these propositions, Justice Frankfurter found it "clear beyond peradventure that" the levy
was "'on the privilege of engaging in . . . interstate business" and hence violated the prohibitions of the commerce clause. Id. at 104.
39 335 U.S. at 99-105.
40 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
41 See Freeman, 329 U.S. at 252-58; notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
42 340 U.S. at 603, 608. Spector was a corporation engaged in transporting freight between
states. Id. at 607. A part of that business involved the utilization of two terminals in Connecticut for assembling the cargo into full truckloads. Id. The collection of freight at these terminals
was found to be merely an integrated aspect of the entire interstate operation. Id.; Spector
Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 135 Conn. 37, 44, 61 A.2d 89, 93 (1948). Additionally, Spector had
been authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission to operate an interstate trucking business and had registered as a foreign corporation in Connecticut. 340 U.S. at 606-07. The
corporation had not, however, been authorized by the state to conduct its business on an intrastate basis. Id. at 607. The determination that Spector was engaged entirely in interstate commerce was crucial to the Court's decision since the majority allowed that a similar privilege tax
could have been assessed on a mixed interstate and intrastate business. Id. at 609-10.
In writing for the Court in Complete Auto Transit, Justice Blackmun noted the factual
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that the same tax could have been validly imposed through a number
of other approaches, and that the tax "[did] not discriminate between
interstate and intrastate commerce," the Court nevertheless contended that these factors were irrelevant if an improper "constitutional channel" had been utilized. 4 3 Consequently, although the
Court agreed with the proposition that interstate commerce could validly be required to carry its share of the cost of state services, 44 it
was noted that any tax upon "the privilege [of] engag[ing] in -interstate commerce" impinged upon the congressional taxing power and
thereby rendered the tax unconstitutional. 4 5 Apparently rejecting
the approach taken by the plurality in Memphis Natural Gas,4 6 the
Spector Court further suggested the absolute nature of this prohibition by noting that "[t]he constitutional infirmity ... persists no mat47
ter how fairly [the tax] is apportioned."
In contrast, the dissent in Spector contended that the statute had
been "declared invalid simply because the State ha[d] verbally
characterized it as a levy on the privilege of doing business within its
borders." 4 8 Finding that the levy met all "practical test[s] of fairness
and propriety," 49 the dissent maintained that the previously recog-

similarity between Spector and the case at bar. See 430 U.S. at 283-84. For a discussion of the
facts in Complete Auto Transit, see notes 1-6 supra & 85-88 infra and accompanying text.
4a 340 U.S. at 607-09. The Court suggested, for example, that the tax would have been
valid had it been levied as compensation for the use of the state's highways or as an ad valorem
property tax. See id. at 607, 609. Those taxes, which were based upon activities subject to the
sovereign authority exercised by a state, were to be tested by the reasonableness and
nondiscriminatory nature of the tax. Id. at 609. It was, however, stated that such an inquiry was
unnecessary if the state chose an improper form for its tax. Id. at 608-09.
44 See id. at 608-10.
45 Id. at 608, 610. Justice Burton reasoned that the states had, by virtue of the commerce
clause, relinquished to Congress the sole power to tax interstate commerce. Id. at 608. Additionally, it was asserted that although the states retained extensive taxing power in certain areas,
"the constitutional separation of... federal and state powers makes it essential that no state be
permitted to exercise . . . those functions . . . delegated exclusively to Congress." Id. Finally,

the Court relied upon what it deemed to be "long-established" legal authority refusing to sanction state taxation of "exclusively interstate commerce." Id. at 610.
" See 335 U.S. at 92-96; notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
47 340 U.S. at 609.
48 Id. at 611. The dissent reasoned that such an approach had been taken merely because

the Court had found no activities which could be categorized as intrastate. Id. As a result, the
dissent concluded that the Court had utilized a different "standard" which ignored the fundamental practicalities of the tax. Id.
49 Id. at 612. The dissent urged that, since the tax "ha[d] been clearly demonstrated" to be
"nondiscriminatory, fairly apportioned and not an undue burden on interstate commerce," it
afforded "adequate protection" to interstate commerce. Id. at 610, 614-15. It was suggested that
it was more appropriate to inquire into "whether the State, in fact, provide[d] protection and
services" or whether interstate commerce had been placed "at a competitive disadvantage." Id.
at 611.
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nized "competing demands of federal and state governmental spheres
.. . required" flexibility in analyzing the validity of such state taxation. 50 Considering the benefits conferred by the state on the corporation, it was concluded "that there [was] no ...warrant for cloaking
5
a purely verbal standard with constitutional dignity." 1
Although the majority in Spector disclaimed reliance upon purely
semantic statutory differences, 52 subsequent holdings indicated that,
under Spector, the particular statutory language used could be of decisive importance. 53 Illustrative of this result was the Court's handling of the Railway Express cases. 54 In Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. Virginia (Railway Express 1)55 the Court was confronted with
the constitutionality of an ambiguously categorized Virginia tax assessed on an interstate express company. 5 6 Analyzing the operation of
the tax, the Court rejected the state's attempted justification of the
levy as a property or gross receipts tax. 57 The Court concluded that
the tax was, in substance, "a privilege tax ... that [could not] be
applied to an exclusively interstate business." 58 Virginia subsequently

50 Id. at 613.
51 Id. at 614.
52 Id. at 608. The majority had specifically disavowed their reliance upon mere formalism by

stating that the issue was "not a matter of labels." Rather, the Court asserted that "the incidence of the tax provide[d] the answer." Id.
53 Compare Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954) (Railway Express
I) (ambiguously characterized tax held invalid as privilege tax) with Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959) (Railway Express II) (amended statute characterized tax as
franchise tax in going concern); see notes 54-63 infra and accompanying text.
54 Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959); Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954).
55 347 U.S. 359 (1954).
56 Id. at 363-64. The Court noted that the Virginia legislature had given the tax "a trinity of
characterizations," variously categorizing the levy as "in addition to the 'property tax,"' as "'an
annual license tax"' and finally as an assessment "'for the privilege of doing business in [the]
State."' Id.
57 Id. at 363.
58 Id. at 369. The majority's decision does not appear to be unjust in light of the relevant
facts. Railway Express operated on both an interstate and intrastate basis in every state except
Virginia. Id. at 360. The Virginia State Constitution prohibited "a foreign corporation [from]
exercis[ing] any public service powers or functions." Id. As a result, "a separate Virginia subsidiary .. .was organized." Id. at 361. Virginia denied Railway Express the privilege of operating on an intrastate basis and at the same time attempted to tax the organization "'for the
privilege of doing business."' Id. at 361-63. The Supreme Court held that Virginia's attempted
levy was unconstitutional. Id. at 369.
It is noteworthy that the majority disavowed the dissent's contention that the decision was
based simply on the use of labels. Id. at 363, 370-72. The majority stated that "'[they were]
concerned only with [the tax's] practical operation,"' id. at 363 (quoting Lawrence v. State Tax
Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276, 280 (1932)), and that "'neither the state courts nor the legislatures, by
giving the tax a particular name or by the use of some form of words, can take away [the
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amended the statute, characterizing the tax as a franchise tax based
upon going concern value. 59 Although the change lacked any appreciable economic significance, 60 in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v.
Virginia (Railway Express 11)61 the Court upheld the validity of the
tax viewing it as a property tax instead of a prohibited tax on the
privilege of doing business. 62 Writing the plurality opinion, Justice
use
Clark conceded the possibility that the Court could focus on "the 63
of magic words . . . to disable an otherwise constitutional levy."
The Spector rule was further distinguished in Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota,6 4 decided the same day as Railway Express
II, in which the Court validated a state net income tax assessed on
interstate sales. 65 Although the validity of Spector's prohibition was
conceded by the Court, 66 it was reasoned that a properly apportioned
Court's] duty to consider its nature and effect,"' id. (quoting Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. Co. v.
Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 227 (1908)).
In contrast, Justice Clark, dissenting, argued that the constitutionality of a tax should be
based upon factors other than the label given it by the legislature or the state's clairvoyance in
determining which language the Supreme Court would find acceptable. Id. at 372. In criticizing
the majority's approach, Justice Clark contended that the Court should not have rejected the
constitutionally acceptable characterization given the tax by the highest court of Virginia. Id. at
370.

11 1956 Va. Acts, c.612 (codified at VA. CODE § 58-546 & 547 (1963)).
60 Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 446 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring).
61 358 U.S. 434 (1959).
62 Id. at 440, 445. Relying upon the Virginia supreme court of appeals' construction of the
reworded statute as a franchise tax applied to "intangible [property] or 'going concern' value,"
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 199 Va. 589, 596, 100 S.E.2d 785, 791 (1957), the
Court upheld the tax as not barred by the restrictions of the commerce clause. 358 U.S. at
440-42. The Supreme Court rejected appellant's additional argument that the amount of the tax
was calculated in such a manner as to violate due process. Id. at 443. Since the Express Company had failed to furnish a statement of gross receipts as was required by the tax statute, the
Court required "an affirmative showing" that the method of calculation was "palpably unreasonable," a burden the company was unable to sustain. Id. at 436, 443.
Id. at 441. Although it was maintained that the use by a state of particular labels would
not cure an unconstitutional tax, Justice Clark allowed that the converse-the invalidation of a
legitimate tax on the basis of the label used-had been done in previous decisions by the
Court. Id.
- 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
65 Id. at 452. In discussing the validity of a net income tax as levied upon an interstate
business, the Court held that such a tax would be a valid exercise of "state taxation [power]
provided the levy is not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities within the
taxing State forming [a] sufficient nexus to support the" tax. Id.
66 Id. at 458. The Court stated that, even though previous holdings in the area of state
taxation of interstate commerce had led to some confusion, certain principles were beyond dispute. Id. Included in this category were the prohibitions against taxing "the 'privilege' of engaging in interstate commerce, . . . impos[ing] a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce .. .[and] subjecting interstate commerce to the burden of 'multiple taxation."' Id. (citations omitted).
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net income tax was nevertheless constitutionally acceptable.

67

The

Court's analysis was based upon the contention that a levy of this
type "afford[ed] [to the states] a valid 'constitutional channel"' for taxation affecting interstate commerce. 68

In contrast, the Court ob-

served that Spector concerned a tax based upon "the privilege of
doing business . .. had long been declared unavailable" as an inci-

dent of state taxation. 6 9 The Court did not discuss, however,
whether such distinctions had any basis in actual economic or practi70
cal consequences.
The Court's analysis in Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 71 further
illustrated the artificial approach engendered by the application of the
Spector rule. 7 2

In that case, Louisiana had taxed a corporation

operating an interstate pipeline "'for the privilege of carrying on or
doing business . . . within [that] state."'73

A state appellate court,

relying upon Spector had invalidated the tax after Colonial had challenged its validity. 74 Subsequently, the Louisiana legislature
amended the statute to operate on the "doing of business . .. in a
corporate form." 75 The Louisiana supreme court upheld this version
67 Id.

at 458-59.
68 Id. at 464. The Court distinguished between an invalid "privilege" tax and a valid tax,
based upon income earned in interstate commerce, which was properly apportioned to the
taxing state, did not discriminate against interstate commerce and was "'reasonably related to
the powers of the State."' Id. at 462-64 (quoting Spector Motor Service, 340 U.S. at 609
(1951)). The Court declined to discuss the possibility that statutes based upon net income derived from interstate operations might not always be properly apportioned and could lead to
multiple taxation since the issue had not been raised. Id. at 462--63.
69 id. at 464.
70 See id. at 452-65.
71 421 U.S. 100 (1975).
72 See id. at 114-15 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Hellerstein, supra note 22, at 185-86; Note,
Pipelines, Privileges and Labels: Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 835,
856-58 (1976).
73 421 U.S. at 101-02 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:601 (West 1950) (current version
at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:601 (West Cum. Supp. 1977)). Colonial Pipeline, a Delaware
corporation, operated an interstate pipeline with approximately 258 miles of the line located
within Louisiana. Id. Although approximately 25-30 people were employed to maintain the
pipeline, Colonial had no offices and no other personnel in the state during the years in question. Id. at 102. Furthermore, Colonial had no intrastate business in Louisiana. Id.
"4 Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Mouton, 228 So. 2d 718, 721, 723 (La. Ct. of App. 1969), cert.
denied, 255 La. 474, 231 So. 2d 393 (1970). The statute read, in pertinent part: "[t]he tax levied
herein is due and payable for the privilege of carrying on or doing business." LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 47:601 (West 1950) (current version at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:601 (West Cum.
Supp. 1977)) (emphasis added). Based upon that language, the Louisiana appeals court had held
the statute to be in violation of the commerce clause, as interpreted by Spector and, as such,
could not be applied to businesses engaged entirely in interstate commerce. See 228 So. 2d at
723.
" Act of July 13, 1970, 1970 La. Acts 856, No. 325, § 1 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 47:601(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977)).
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of the tax 76 and the United States Supreme Court affirmed, 77 reasoning that Louisiana conferred "powers, privileges, and benefits"
adequate to support the tax. 78 The Court distinguished Spector concluding that, rather than operating on the privilege of doing business,
the statute was "related to ... activities within the State in the corporate form." 79
In concurring, Justice Blackmun contended that the distinction
employed by the majority "ma[de] little constitutional sense-and
certainly no practical sense." 80 Justice Blackmun argued that the
Court's previous opinions in this area had not been as "plain [or as]
analytically consistent as the [majority's] opinion" had suggested and
that prior opinions afforded little certainty as to which taxing statutes
would be valid under the commerce clause. 8 1 Due to the inconsistency of the views expressed in cases such as Memphis Natural Gas
and Spector, he urged that one of the lines of precedent be expressly
followed. 82 Asserting that it was difficult to reconcile the Colonial
decision with Spector, Justice Blackmun argued that Spector should
83
have been overruled.

76 Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Agerton, 289 So. 2d 93, 101 (La. 1974). An assessment upon
Colonial under the new statute was challenged by the company as violative of the commerce
clause. Id. at 94, 96. The Louisiana court of appeals accepted this contention, holding that the
amendment did not affect the incidence of the tax and, therefore, the new statute was also
unconstitutional. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Agerton, 275 So. 2d 834, 837-38 (La. Ct. of App.
1973), revd, 289 So. 2d 93 (La. 1974). The state supreme court reversed, holding "that the local
incident taxed [was] the form of doing business rather than the business done by [the] corporation," and therefore the statute was valid under the commerce clause. 289 So. 2d at 100-01
(emphasis in original). The Louisiana supreme court based its opinion on several factors: the
nondiscriminatory nature of the tax; the existence of a sufficient nexus between the taxpayer and
the taxing state; the finding that the tax was duly proportioned; and the validity of the local
incidence of the tax. Id.
77 421 U.S. at 101.
78 Id. at 109.

79 Id. at 112-14. As a further justification for the statute's constitutional validity the Court
noted that the tax was "a fairly apportioned and nondiscriminatory means of requiring [Colonial]
to pay its just share of the cost of state government." Id. at 114.
The Court drew support for its analysis from the Memphis Natural Gas case 421 U.S. at
109-11; see notes 33-38 supra and accompanying text. Comparing the fact pattern in Memphis
Natural Gas to that of Colonial Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 109-10, the Court found that in each case
a franchise tax had been imposed upon an exclusively interstate operation with a pipeline running through the taxing state. Id. at 101-02, 110. Additionally, the Court noted that both state
supreme courts had upheld the taxes on the basis of benefits provided by the taxing states. Id.
at 110; see Hellerstein, supra note 22, at 182-83, Note, supra note 72, at 852.
80 421 U.S. at 115 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
81 Id. at 114-15.
82 Id. at 115.
1 Id. at 114-15. Justice Blackmun contended that to distinguish between "the conduct[ing]
of business in interstate commerce [and] . . . the conduct[ing] of business in interstate com-
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In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court in Complete Auto
Transit adopted this viewpoint and formally overruled Spector.8 4 The
Court noted the similarity between Spector and Complete Auto
Transit in bQth the statutory language and the factual context presented.8 5 Additionally, the Court emphasized that the tax was not
claimed to be discriminatory, "unfairly apportioned," "unrelated to"
the benefits derived by the taxpayer or lacking "a sufficient nexus"
between the tax and the activity. 86 Conceding that the Spector rule
had some "abstract" validity, 8 7 the Court nevertheless reaffirmed the
proposition that the commerce clause was not intended "'to relieve
88
. .. interstate commerce from [its] just share of state tax[es]."'
Finding a trend "toward a standard of permissibility ... based
upon . . . actual effect," the Court analyzed the Spector doctrine in
terms of its practical consequences.8 9 Reasoning that the Spector
doctrine would have been inapplicable had the state branded the tax

merce 'in a corporate form"' as the incidence of a taxing statute was "taxation by semantics." Id.
at 115-16. In his dissent, Justice Stewart also viewed the distinction as "specious" and additionally noted that, until formally overruled, Spector still had precedential value and required invalidation of the tax in question. Id. at 116.
84 430 U.S. at 274, 289.
85 Id. at 287. In both cases, the taxpayer had been engaged solely in interstate commerce
and the tax in question had been levied upon "'the privilege of... doing business' in Mississippi." Id. (quoting Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-65-13 (1972) (originally codified at Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 10105 (1942)). For a discussion of the facts of Spector, see note 42 supra and accompanying
text.
86 430 U.S. at 277-78, 287. Complete Auto Transit had challenged the validity of the tax, in
accordance with Spector, solely on the basis that the tax was imposed on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Id. at 278.
87 Id. at 288 & n.15; see notes 111-112 infra and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun
discussed the "Free Flow" concept of interstate commerce enunciated in Freeman, reasoning
that such analysis could have been "the keystone of a movement toward absolute immunity of
interstate commerce from state taxation." 430 U.S. at 281. For a discussion of Freeman, see
notes 24-32 supra and accompanying text. However, it was asserted that such a trend would
have been in conflict with the Court's frequent holdings that interstate commerce could be
required to compensate individual states for the services they had rendered. Id. at n.ll.
88 430 U.S. at 288 (quoting Colonial Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 108).
89 Id. at 281, 283--87. In analyzing the theory underlying Spector, the Court noted that
since the "rule look[ed] only to the fact that the incidence of the tax [was] the 'privilege of
doing business' . . . [the rule] deem[ed] irrelevant any consideration of the practical effect of
the tax." Id. at 278. The Court then discussed several decisions which had utilized an approach
based upon the "practical effect" of the tax in question. Id. at 279. See, e.g., Colonial Pipeline,
421 U.S. 113-14; General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 440-41, 446-49 (1964);
Northwestern States Portland Cement, 358 U.S. at 461-65 (1959); Memphis Gas, 335 U.S. at 93,
96. The Complete Auto Transit opinion noted that this approach had been utilized in approving
taxes that had "avoided running afoul" of Spector but had, nevertheless, refused to overrule that
case. 430 U.S. at 279. Thus, the Court concluded that "[u]nder the present state of the law" the
prohibition of Spector "has no relationship to economic realities." Id.
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differently, 90 the Court concluded that the use of a particular label
signified no intrinsic economic distinctions.9 1 Rather, reliance upon
such "formalism" was found only to impede the inquiry into any "forbidden effect" incident to the application of the tax. 92 Based upon
this analysis, the Court held that a state tax upon the privilege of
engaging in an interstate business no longer merited the classification
of "per se unconstitutional[ity]."93 Although the Court concluded
that a "privilege" tax will no longer be considered "per se unconstitutional," it was conceded that, due to the dangers inherent in such
a tax, a "careful scrutiny [should be utilized by] the courts to determine whether it produces a forbidden effect on interstate com94
merce."
It should be noted that the Spector decision was both a departure from the traditional federal interest analysis prescribed in the
commerce clause context by Cooley 95 as well as in sharp contrast to
the approach exemplified by Memphis Gas.96 A blanket prohibition
on state "privilege" taxation eschews inquiry into whether the tax impinges on an interest "in [its] nature national." 97 Although results
were inconsistent and modes of analysis varied, 98 decisions in the
context of state taxation of interstate commerce, such as Memphis
Gas, had identified those considerations which, as a practical matter,
implicated the federal interest in the free flow of commerce. 99 To
the extent that Spector had abandoned this approach, it represented a
divergence from the pragmatism expressed in Cooley. 10 0 It has been
suggested by some courts that at the root of the intractability of the
problem of state taxation of interstate commerce 101 has been a failure
90 Id. at

288.

91 Id.
92

Id.

93 See id. at 288-89.
" Id. at 288 n.15.
95 See Cooley, 53 U.S. at 319; notes 17-20 supra and 97 infra and accompanying text.
96 See 335 U.S. at 87-88, 93, 96; note 35 supra and accompanying text.
97 See Cooley, 53 U.S. at 319.
98 Compare Freeman, 329 U.S. at 252-53, 255-57 (basis for attack was whether or not tax
was "direct" or "indirect" levy on interstate commerce) with Memphis Natural Gas, 335 U.S. at
87-88 (held impermissible to base a tax on the privilege of doing interstate business). See note
22 supra and accompanying text.
99 See Memphis Natural Gas, 335 U.S. at 87-88; Freeman, 329 U.S. at 261-62, 270-74
(Rutledge, J., concurring).
100 Compare Cooley, 53 U.S. at 315-21 (local regulation of harbor pilotage upheld as not
violative of commerce clause), with Spector Motor Service, 340 U.S. at 607-10 (taxation of
interstate trucking line held per se unconstitutional).
101 See, e.g., Colonial Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 101 (tax levied on "the privilege of doing business" in the corporate form upheld); Northwestern Cement, 358 U.S. at 457--58 (properly appor-
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to analyze the question precisely in terms of whether federalism demanded the predominance of federal interests with regard to a given
tax. 102

Although the decision in Complete Auto Transit eliminates an
unrealistic approach to the problem of state taxation of interstate
commerce, 10 3 the Court offered no original modes of analysis for the
evaluation of a given tax.' 0 4 The Spector Court had limited its holding to purely interstate businesses. 10 5 In all other cases, the Court
10 6
suggested that a practical analysis of the tax was to be utilized.
Therefore, by overruling Spector, the Complete Auto Transit Court
extended this pragmatic approach to cases involving purely interstate
business. 10 7 Thus, the Court in Complete Auto Transit substantially
reaffirmed an approach developed in prior cases. 10 8 This approach
mandates that, in order to survive a commerce clause challenge, a tax
must be nondiscriminatory, fairly apportioned, sufficiently connected
with the benefit derived from the state by the taxpayer and must be
assessed upon a taxpayer with an adequate nexus to the taxing
state. 0 9 Nothing in this case is indicative of an approach intended to
grant a carte blanche to the states in their taxation of interstate commerce. 110 The Court was careful to note, for example, that a "tailored tax," such as one incident to the privilege of conducting an interstate business, might require stricter judicial scrutiny."' The
Court in Complete Auto Transit suggested that taxes of this type present an "increased danger" of a "forbidden effect" upon interstate

tioned net income tax on interstate sales upheld as valid constitutional channel); Freeman, 329
U.S. at 252 ("direct" tax upon interstate commerce held invalid); Barrett, supra note 14 at
496-97.
1o2See Colonial Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 115-16 (Blackmun, J.,concurring); Spector Motor Service, 340 U.S. at 613 (Clark, J.,dissenting). Characterizing Spector as an "aberration" Justice
Blackmun alluded to the "realities of" the federal-state relationship and reasoned that "the
ability of our States and of the Federal Government to coexist have matured" to the point
where economically fair state taxes should be approved "in the absence of congressional proscription." 421 U.S. at 115-16.
103 430 U.S. at 287-89. See Hellerstein, supra note 22, at 179-80, 185-88; Note, supra note
72, at 854-57.
104 See 430 U.S. at 277-78, 287-89.
105 340 U.S. at 609-10.
106See id. at 610.
107See 430 U.S. at 278, 287-89.
108 See id.at 278-287.
109 Id. at 277-78, 287; see 421 U.S. at 115-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring); 358 U.S. at
457-58; 335 U.S. at 87-88.
110 See 430 U.S. at 274-289.
"1 Id. at 288-89 n. 15.
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commerce. 112 Under the Complete Auto Transit case, however, such
taxes are no longer "per se unconstitutional."113 Rather, the standards developed for judging the adequacy of state taxes which were
not directly levied upon the "privilege" of conducting such business
114
remain applicable in those cases.
Evalyn B. David

112 Id.
The Court, however, indicated that "privilege" taxes were not unique in this regard
and that property and income taxes could be used discriminatorily as well. Id.
11 Id. at 288-89.
114 See note 109 supra and accompanying text.

